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AGREEMENTS:                               
RETURNING CULTURAL PATRIMONY,  
PERPETUATING THE ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES 
MARKET 
Stacey Falkoff * 
INTRODUCTION 
“I began to reflect: What’s the best way out?”—Phillipe De 
Montebello, director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
in New York, explaining that he only became interested in 
negotiating with the Italian government for the return of 
antiquities when he concluded that the issue “would not go 
away.”1 
 
A flush of repatriation claims brought in the past two years 
against several American museums has drawn much attention to 
extrajudicial mutually beneficial repatriation agreements 
(“MBRAs”) as an answer to cultural property disputes. The stage 
was set in February 2006, when the Republic of Italy and the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York (the “Met”) entered 
into a reciprocity that has been hailed as a “landmark agreement”2 
                                                           
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.A. McGill University, 2003. 
Thanks to my mom and dad for their unyielding love, encouragement, and 
support. Thanks also to the members of the Journal of Law and Policy Editorial 
Board for their editing assistance. 
1 Randy Kennedy & Hugh Eakin, Met Chief, Unbowed, Defends Museum’s 
Role, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at E1. 
2 Sharon Flescher, News and Updates, 8 IFAR J. 4 (2005/06). 
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and a “blueprint for future negotiations with other museums that 
own artifacts with . . . disputed provenance[s].”3 The Met agreed 
to return twenty-one likely looted and illegally exported artifacts to 
Italy in three installments over a four-year period,4 and, in 
exchange, the Italian Ministry of Culture (hereinafter referred to as 
“Italy”) promised the Met long-term loans5 of works of 
“equivalent importance and beauty.”6 
Not long after this prominent MBRA, in April 2006, the 
director of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts (the “BMFA”) 
traveled to Italy to engage in similar discussions regarding the 
provenance of certain objects that the museum purchased between 
the early 1970s and the late 1990s.7 Six months later, the BMFA 
and the Italian government entered into an analogous agreement, 
whereby the museum voluntarily returned thirteen Greek and 
Roman antiquities to the Italian government,8 and Italy promised to 
lend the BMFA works for two upcoming exhibitions.9 
This trend continued in July 2006, when the J. Paul Getty 
                                                           
3 Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy Makes its Choices of Antiquities to Lend Met, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at E2. 
4 Flescher, supra note 2. These works included the Euphronios krater, 
purchased by the Met in 1972 for $1 million, and the Morgantina Collection, 
consisting of fifteen pieces purchased in two lots in 1981 and 1982 for $2.75 
million. Andrew L. Slayman, The Trial in Rome, ARCHAEOLOGY, Feb. 6, 
2006, http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/italytrial/index.html. 
5 Under Italian law, state museums may loan works to foreign institutions 
for a maximum of three years. Kurt G. Siehr, Globalization and National 
Culture: Recent Trends Toward a Liberal Exchange of Objects, 38 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1067, 1094 (2005). 
6 Elisabetta Povoledo, Met to Sign Accord in Italy to Return Vase and 
Artifacts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at E2. 
7 Ralph Frammolino & Jason Felch, Boston Museum Returns 13 
Antiquities to Italy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at A4. These included a 
marble statue dating back to A.D. 136, a candelabrum, ancient Greek water jugs, 
and classical vessels, for which the BMFA paid a total of $834,000. Peter 
Popham, US Museum Returns Looted Antiquities as Italians Stand up for Lost 
Heritage and Pride, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 1, 2006, at 55. 
8 Popham, supra note 7. 
9 Pursuant to the agreement, the Italian Culture Ministry will lend 
antiquities to the BMFA for upcoming exhibits about Renaissance Venice and 
artistic treasures from Naples. Frammolino & Felch, supra note 7. 
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Museum in Los Angeles (the “Getty”) announced that it would 
return a sixth-century gold funerary relief and a fourth-century 
grave marker purchased in 1955 and 1993, respectively, alleged to 
have been illegally exported from Greece.10 The Minister of Culture 
for the Hellenic Republic issued a formal statement several months 
later, indicating that, in exchange, “the Ministry [will] work with 
the Getty . . . to establish a broad framework for cultural 
cooperation in areas of common interest, including loans of 
important artifacts and periodical exhibitions.”11 Most recently, in 
July 2007, after more than three years of negotiations, the Getty 
agreed to return forty prized artifacts to Italy,12 including a life-
sized statue of Aphrodite dating from the 5th century B.C., a 
sculpture called “Griffons Attacking a Fallen Doe,” and a statue of 
Apollo.13 In exchange, Italy promised to drop civil charges against 
the Getty’s former curator of antiquities, Marion True, who is 
accused of trafficking looted art.14 Additionally, Italy agreed to 
allow the museum to keep the sculpture of Aphrodite until 2010, 
and the parties resolved to establish a “heightened level of 
cooperation [with one another,] enabling them to borrow each 
others’ artworks . . . far more liberally than in the past.”15 
Willingness on the part of American museums to repatriate 
artifacts without legal mandates is not unprecedented,16 and 
                                                           
10 Hugh Eakin, Getty Museum Agrees to Return Two Antiquities to Greece, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2006, at E1. 
11 Press Release, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Culture and the J. Paul 
Getty Trust Issue Joint Statement (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.getty.edu/ 
news/press/center/statement06_getty_greek_joint_release_121106.html. 
12 Jason Felch & Ari Bloomekatz, Getty’s Accord Removes Shadow; The 
Specter of Recent Scandals is Starting to Lift from the Museum and its 
Programs on News of an Agreement to Return Antiquities to Italy, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 3, 2007, at B1. 
13 Returning Stolen Treasure, THE CANBERRA TIMES, Aug. 11, 2007, at 
A8. 
14 Felch & Bloomekatz, supra note 12. 
15 Returning Stolen Treasure, supra note 13. 
16 For example, in 1996, the Met returned two illuminated palm-leaf 
manuscript folios to Calcutta. Norman Palmer, Statutory, Forensic and Ethical 
Initiatives in the Recovery of Stolen Art and Antiquities, in THE RECOVERY OF 
STOLEN ART 9 (Norman Palmer ed., 1998). In 1996, “the Court of the First 
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repatriation resulting from deals struck between art-rich source 
nations and museums is hardly novel.17 Nevertheless, the 
repatriation movement is steadily gaining momentum,18 as both 
public notions of propriety evolve and as art-rich nations gain a 
greater awareness of “the dual scientific and economic justifications 
for expending resources to recover their plundered past[s].”19 The 
accords reached in the last year suggest that MBRAs are likely to 
become the new protocol for resolving cultural property 
disputes.20 
                                                           
Instance of Genoa in Italy ordered the restitution of 87 archaeological pieces to 
Ecuador, and in 2000, 59 pre-Colombian artifacts were returned to Peru from 
Canada. UNESCO Home Page, http://portal.unesco.org (follow “Culture” 
hyperlink; then follow “Normative Action” hyperlink; then follow “Heritage” 
hyperlink; then follow “Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return 
of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in case of Illicit 
Appropriation” hyperlink; then follow “Information Kit on Restitution” 
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). 
17 For example, in 1974, the Norton Simon Museum in Los Angeles 
agreed to return a statue of the Natarja to India. In return, India promised to 
withdraw its lawsuit against the museum, to allow the museum to retain the 
statue for ten years before its official return, and to lend the museum other 
objects in the near future. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, ALBERT E. ELSEN & 
STEPHEN K. URICE, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 340 (5th ed.,  Kluwer 
Law Int’l 2007) (1979). In 1986, the M.H. de Young Memorial Museum in San 
Francisco agreed to repatriate 35 pre-Colombian murals to Mexico after reaching 
a bilateral agreement with the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia 
concerning their “custody, conservation, and exhibition.” JEANETTE 
GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES 269 (2d ed. 1996). 
18 John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the 
Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part Two), 28 
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 6 (2004). 
19 Michael J. Kelly, Conflicting Trends in the Flourishing International 
Trade of Art and Antiquities, 14 DICK. J. INT’L L. 31, 45 (1995). 
20 Reni Gertner, Litigators of the Lost Art: Museums to Avoid Lawsuits 
over Antiquities by Proof of Their Provenances, MISSOURI LAWYERS WEEKLY, 
Aug. 28, 2006, at NEWS; see also Robert K. Paterson, The “Caring and 
Sharing” Alternative: Recent Progress in the International Law Association to 
Develop Draft Cultural Material Principles, 12 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL PROP. 
62, 65 (2005) (“While . . . there have been some instances of refusal to consider 
requests for the return of sensitive cultural material to its place of origin, far more 
common have been instances of some sort of compromise solution.”). 
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While recognizing that MBRAs have the potential to confer 
distinct benefits, this Note will argue that they are nonetheless 
undesirable. Part I will lay the foundation for the discussion by 
providing an overview of the problem of the illicit antiquities 
market, as well as the fundamental arguments proffered in support 
of repatriation. Part II will examine the MBRA reached between 
the Met and Italy last year, acknowledging both the primary and 
subsidiary benefits that MBRAs can yield. Part III will then 
assume a more global perspective, revealing that, unfortunately, 
MBRAs inadvertently encourage museums to continue to acquire 
objects of questionable provenance and detract from the formation 
of much-needed legal precedent in the field. Part III will 
additionally provide an analysis of the hurdles and general 
uncertainties that source nations face when they seek to repatriate 
their cultural property under international law. By juxtaposing the 
benefits and drawbacks of MBRAs, this Note will demonstrate 
that, while MBRAs may eventually provide an ideal means for 
resolving cultural property disputes, their use at this point only 
functions to ensure the continuance of the black market. 
I.   BACKGROUND 
A. The Need to Curb the Illicit Antiquities Market 
The illicit antiquities trade is thriving.21 Attaching a precise 
financial value to such a secretive trade is difficult, but it is 
frequently purported to be second only to drug trafficking in the 
                                                           
21 Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed 
Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 382 (1995) (“International 
antiquities smuggling has become an epidemic, affecting Europe, the Middle 
East, Africa, Asia, Latin America, North America, and virtually every nation.”); 
see also Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum 
Collections and the Fiduciary Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 446 (2003) (“The problem of antiquities 
looted directly from archaeological excavations is now recognized as one of 
considerable monetary magnitude and of worldwide scope.”). 
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hierarchy of lucrative underground markets.22 From 1972 to 1990, 
its profits are said to have doubled from one billion to two billion 
dollars,23 and recent studies estimate that the trade currently 
generates approximately six billion dollars per year.24 While 
thousands of artifacts enter the trade every day,25 recovery 
prospects remain bleak. Only between five to ten percent of 
objects that are illegally excavated and/or exported in contravention 
of national patrimony and national export laws are recovered.26 
Moreover, the average recovery of such illicit antiquities is 
estimated to be a slow 13.4 years.27 The vast majority of these 
objects eventually enters the legitimate art market.28 
Realistically, a number of factors render it improbable that the 
illicit antiquities trade will ever cease to exist:29 Discrepancies 
                                                           
22 Jane Warring, Underground Debates: The Fundamental Differences of 
Opinion that Thwart UNESCO’s Progress in Fighting the Illicit Trade in 
Cultural Property, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 227, 234 (2005). 
23 Julia A. McCord, The Strategic Targeting of Diligence: A New 
Perspective in Stemming the Illicit Trade in Art, 70 IND. L.J. 985, 986 (1995). 
24 David N. Chang, Stealing Beauty: Stopping the Madness of Illicit Art 
Trafficking, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 829, 832 (2006). The trade largely operates 
with tomb robbers searching out these artifacts, and selling them to middlemen, 
who enjoy significant profits when they resell the works to private buyers or 
institutions. Sue J. Park, The Cultural Property Regime in Italy: An 
Industrialized Nation’s Difficulties in Retaining and Recovering its Antiquities, 
23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 931, 931 (2002). 
25 See Chauncey D. Steele IV, The Morgantina Treasure: Italy’s Quest for 
the Repatriation of Looted Artifacts, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 667, 
683 (2000). 
26 Sarah S. Conley, International Art Theft, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 493, 493 
n.6 (1995). National patrimony laws vest ownership of all cultural property of a 
particular age in the state, including that which has not yet been discovered. 
National export laws generally restrict the export of cultural objects.  Jessica Eve 
Morrow, The National Stolen Property Act and the Return of Stolen Cultural 
Property to its Rightful Owners, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 249, 252 
(2007). 
27 Chang, supra note 24. 
28 Christa L. Kirby, Stolen Cultural Property: Available Museum 
Responses to an International Dilemma, 104 DICK. L. REV. 729, 730–31 
(2000). 
29 See Chang, supra note 24. 
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between national laws can be used to launder works of tainted 
title;30 the physical dimensions of the objects often allow them to 
be easily removed from their countries and resold; and the nature of 
the antiquities market31 espouses secrecy as the norm for both 
legitimate and illegitimate international transactions.32 In addition, 
notwithstanding the enormous profits the trade yields, 
corresponding criminal penalties are relatively mild, and certainly 
serve as less of a deterrent than those associated with similarly 
lucrative black markets, such as arms and drug trafficking.33 
Despite the trade’s inevitability, the nations of the world have 
a shared interest in curbing it to the greatest extent possible. The 
illegal excavations and looting upon which the black market 
depends have disastrous, irreparable effects.34 They “destroy[] 
important aspects of the cultural heritage of source nations,”35 
thereby creating sizeable gaps in source nations’ senses of 
identities.36 Moreover, whether performed by professional or 
inexperienced looters, the search for objects with “particular 
                                                           
30 Steven F. Grover, The Need for Civil-Law Nations to Adopt Discovery 
Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative Study, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 
1441 (1992). 
31 McCord, supra note 23, at 989. 
32 Warring, supra note 22, at 240 (citing Barry Meier & Martin Gottlieb, 
An Illicit Journey Out of Egypt, Only a Few Questions Asked, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 23, 2004, at A1) (quoting Ricardo J. Elia) (“[P]eople think that there is an 
illicit market and a legitimate market . . . . [i]n fact, it is the same.”). 
33 Borodkin, supra note 21, at 378 nn.8 & 9 (“Americans routinely receive 
mandatory prison sentences for possession and sale of narcotics. By contrast, a 
typical punishment for smuggling archaeological artifacts is a fine, a suspended 
sentence, and community service.”). 
34 Borodkin, supra note 21, at 382–83 (“Once a site has been worked over 
by looters in order to remove a few salable objects, the fragile fabric of its history 
is largely destroyed.”). 
35 Cohan, supra note 18, at 7. 
36 Cohan, supra note 18, at 7; accord Laura M. Siegle, United States v. 
Schultz: Putting Cultural Property in its Place, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
453, 471 (2004) (stating that “spatial relations among archaeological remains” 
can convey much information that is lost in illicit excavations); see also 
Jonathan S. Moore, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 469 (1988) (stating that anthropological 
archaeologists can learn a great deal about the habits and cultures of ancient 
civilizations through undisturbed sites). 
FALKOFF FINAL AUTHORIZATION 2.DOC 11/26/07 2:09 PM 
272 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
aesthetic or perhaps historical attraction that will have a high 
monetary value on the international art market” exerts tangible 
effects.37 Archaeological sites incur considerable damage,38 and 
objects presumed to be of lesser monetary value are often 
destroyed.39 The value of the very objects that are sought, 
“discovered,” and sold on the black market is diminished as well. 
Their irreversible decontextualization40 dramatically reduces their 
archaeological, anthropological, and art historical significances.41 
Additionally, their market worth is frequently lessened by “hasty 
and inexpert extraction and handling during the various illegal 
transactions that inevitably occur before the[y] . . . finally come[] 
to rest in a collector’s hands or a museum’s vault.”42 
Commentators such as renowned cultural property law expert 
John Merryman contend that the illicit antiquities market is a 
positive phenomenon fueled by an appreciation for the works it 
traffics, a desire to preserve them, and a corresponding belief that 
they can best be taken care of by museums and private collectors.43 
                                                           
37 Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra note 17, at 220. 
38 Cohan, supra note 18; Park, supra note 24 (stating that tomb robbers 
often work “hastily and crudely”); Siegle, supra note 36 (stating that “[i]t is 
important to preserve archaeological sites and their contents so that people can 
understand how, when, and why the objects in them were created.”). 
39 Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra note 17, at 220. 
40 Borodkin, supra note 21, at 399 (“[N]o court-made remedy can replace 
lost archaeological information once an artifact has been dismembered, defaced, 
or isolated from its context.”). 
41 NEIL BRODIE, Export Deregulation and the Illicit Trade in 
Archaeological Material, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL RESOURCES 
85 (Jennifer R. Richman & Mario P. Forsyth eds., 2004); see also Park, supra 
note 24, at 932–33 (“The antiquity, removed from its site without proper 
evaluation, becomes nothing more than a decorative or aesthetic item with little 
or no historical significance.  Even if the item is recovered, the loss of history 
cannot be.”). 
42 Kelly, supra note 19, at 33. 
43 See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, Cultural Property Internationalism, 12 
INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 11, 32 (2005) (stating that “a system, [such as that] 
dictated by the preferences of retentive source nations and zealous 
archaeologists . . . does not provide optimal conditions for the preservation of 
the cultural heritage of all mankind or its optimal distribution for access, study, 
and enjoyment”). 
FALKOFF FINAL AUTHORIZATION 2.DOC 11/26/07 2:09 PM 
 MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL REPATRIATION AGREEMENTS 273 
According to such logic, “many pieces would be ignored or ruined 
if left in place.”44 It is indeed conceivable that a particular ancient 
object might be better attended to in a controlled environment, such 
as on a pedestal in a major museum, than it would if left virtually 
unknown in an underground tomb. But, as already noted, that 
object’s journey through the black market would likely entail a 
significant amount of damage,45 including the permanent loss of 
information regarding that very object and the annihilation of any 
number of other objects that were inadvertently unearthed in its 
illicit excavation.46 In sum, “what the market purports to do 
bestprotect the integrity of individual objectsdoes not always 
succeed, due to both intentional and unintentional damage.”47 
B.  Defining “Repatriation” and its Variations 
Cultural property repatriation is “the return of cultural 
objects,” whether “to [their] nations of origin,” “to the nations 
whose people include the cultural descendants of those who made 
the objects,” or “to the nations whose territory includes their 
original sites or the sites from which they were last removed.”48 
The repatriation movement, and repatriation claims in general, rely 
on two interconnected principles, namely, that cultural property 
belongs in its source country, and that works that currently reside 
abroad in museums and collections as the result of plunder, theft, 
removal by colonial powers, illegal export, or exploitation should 
be returned.49 
When a museum uses the prospect of voluntary repatriation as 
a bargaining chip, the act of repatriation tends to be accompanied 
                                                           
44 Kelly, supra note 19, at 52. 
45 Moore, supra note 36. 
46 Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra note 17, at 220. 
47 Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural 
Objects, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 197, 205–06 (2001) (providing as an example 
that tomb raiders and site looters frequently destroy objects, either for ease of 
transportation or out of ignorance). 
48 John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 
80 AM. J. INT’L L. 831, 845 (1986). 
49 Id. 
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by a promise on the part of the source nation not to institute legal 
proceedings, and often includes a public statement clearing the 
museum’s name.50 Other terms that are commonly negotiated for 
include split custody of the object at issue and the transfer of title 
to the source nation while the object remains housed in the 
museum.51 The parties may agree to a return schedule that allows 
the museum to exhibit the work before relinquishing it, or, as has 
been a popular feature of the recent MBRAs, the source nation 
may promise to lend the museum comparable works in the near 
future.52 
The need to closely examine the utility of MBRAs as a 
variation of voluntary repatriation is pressing. Numerous 
repatriation claims were brought or threatened over the past two 
years: Italy is currently in negotiations for the return of objects 
residing at both the Princeton University Art Museum53 and the 
Cleveland Museum of Art,54 and has suggested that it may soon 
lay claims to works at the Toledo Museum of Art, the 
Minneapolis Institute of Arts, and the Virginia Museum of Fine 
                                                           
50 For instance, the repatriating nation might publicly state that it does not 
believe that the museum acquired the object at issue knowing of its questionable 
provenance, and that the museum was highly cooperative in rectifying the 
situation once informed. Palmer, supra note 16. 
51 For example, in 2002, France and Nigeria entered into an agreement 
wherein France recognized Nigeria’s title to the sculptures at issue, and in 
return, Nigeria agreed to allow those objects to remain at a certain museum in 
France for a renewable period of 25 years. Such leases provide an alternative to 
outright restitution, allowing the market nation to keep the cultural object so 
long as it pays the source nation, in some desirable form, to do so. Warring, 
supra note 22, at 293–94. 
52 This was the case in three of the most prominent MBRAs reached in 
2006 (those between Italy and the Met, Italy and the BMFA, and Greece and the 
Getty), all of which contained provisions specifying that the repatriating nations 
would lend the repatriating nations works in the future. See Flescher, supra note 
2, at 4–5; Frammolino & Felch, supra note 7; Press Release, Hellenic Republic 
Ministry of Culture and The J. Paul Getty Trust Issue Joint Statement, supra 
note 11. 
53 Patty Gerstenblith & Bonnie Czegledi, International Cultural Property, 
40 INT’L LAW. 441, 449 (2006). 
54 Steven Litt, Report Says Italy may Press Art Museum for Antiquities, 
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 2, 2006, at D6. 
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Arts.55 Additionally, Egypt has recently claimed a mask possessed 
by the St. Louis Art Museum and has had a long-standing request 
to Germany for the return of the bust of Nefertiti.56 Finally, in 
September 2007, Yale University agreed to return thousands of 
Inca artifacts to the Peruvian government that were illegally 
removed from Machu Picchu nearly a century ago, but the parties 
have not yet finalized the terms of the return.57 Although by no 
means exhaustive, this list illustrates the copious number of 
MBRAs that may be reached in the proximate future. 
C. The Desirability of Repatriation 
Any analysis of the utility of MBRAs must necessarily begin 
with an examination of whether repatriation is desirable, either as a 
means or an end. This subsection will articulate five primary 
arguments in favor of repatriation and assess the validity of their 
critiques, in order to show that repatriation of select cultural 
property is desirable, both as a remedy for the detrimental effects 
of the illicit antiquities trade and to deter its continuation and 
growth. 
1. Comporting with Morals 
In many situations repatriation may simply seem to be the 
morally appropriate course of action.58 This may be because it 
would remedy the effects of an unfortunate historic event.59 For 
example, the object at issue may have been plundered in time of 
                                                           
55 Gerstenblith & Czegledi, supra note 53. 
56 Flescher, supra note 2, at 5. 
57 Flescher, supra note 2, at 5. 
58 See David Rudenstine, Cultural Property: The Hard Question of 
Repatriation, The Rightness and Utility of Voluntary Repatriation, 19 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 69, 70 (2001) (“[S]elective repatriation of cultural 
patrimony may be the right thing to do in that it responds to a[] historical 
episode that, in the opinion of many, should not have occurred and which 
remains a source of bitter contention today.”). 
59 Id. 
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war or while the source nation was under colonial rule.60 It may 
also be because, as a result of losing its cultural property, the 
source nation has become economically deprived.61 That is, cultural 
property draws tourists, which in turn, boost economies.62 By 
repatriating cultural patrimony, source nations whose people or 
ancestors created the objects receive this benefit, rather than market 
nations63 whose people obtained them illegally.64 
Instead of contesting whether repatriation is the “right” course 
of action in cultural property disputes, anti-repatriationists tend to 
respond by seeking to invalidate the source nation’s title. Their 
rationales may be temporal based, asserting that the current 
possessor of the object has had it for such a long period that it has 
effectively become part of the patrimony of the society in which 
that possessor is located.65 Alternatively, they may be historically 
based. For instance, it has been argued that the “rights of claimants 
have been abrogated . . . [in situations where the] group from which 
the property originated no longer exists.”66 Finally, it is frequently 
asserted that the institution in which a stolen artifact is housed 
should be entitled to maintain it because it is responsible for the 
degree to which the artifact has been preserved.67 
These contentions, however, are highly problematic. While the 
first counter-argument relies upon the inaccurate notion that the 
passage of time necessarily functions as a statute of limitations, the 
second ignores the many benefits that may be gained from 
                                                           
60 See, e.g., Christine K. Knox, They’ve Lost Their Marbles, 29 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 315, 330 (2006) (Ethiopia and Italy reached a deal for the 
return of an enormous 1,700 year old obelisk taken while Ethiopia was under 
colonial rule in 1937. In 2004, Italy dismantled the obelisk and was working on 
transporting it back.). 
61 See Kelly, supra note 19, at 46. 
62 See Kelly, supra note 19, at 46. 
63 Although not necessarily distinct from one another, market nations may 
be thought of as those that have the largest markets for illicit antiquities, and 
source nations as those that tend to supply the market. 
64 Kelly, supra note 19, at 46. 
65 Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 79. 
66 Cohan, supra note 18. 
67 See Greenfield, supra note 17. 
FALKOFF FINAL AUTHORIZATION 2.DOC 11/26/07 2:09 PM 
 MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL REPATRIATION AGREEMENTS 277 
recontextualizing artifacts, even if they are not returned to the 
direct descendants of their creators. The significance of returning 
cultural patrimony is not necessarily that it “is . . . something 
owned by a people, but [rather, that it is] something of them, a 
part of their defining collective identity.”68 Additionally, the third 
counter-argument relies upon the untenable presumption that the 
object would have been damaged or destroyed were it not stolen, 
and that this hypothetical situation should therefore trump the 
rights of the original owner. In short, the moralistic grounds for 
repatriation continue to hold validity as a reason for returning illicit 
cultural property. 
2. Positive Social Effects 
Repatriation also has the potential to exert positive social 
effects. As recent MBRAs demonstrate, “generosity can forge 
bonds between nations and foreign institutions and encourage 
future collaboration[s].”69 One of the driving forces behind the 
MBRA reached between the Getty and Italy in 2006 was the 
Getty’s desire to establish a new working relationship with Italy.70 
In some cases, MBRAs may explicitly require parties to maintain a 
cooperative rapport with one another. For example, under the 
terms of the February 2006 MBRA between the Met and Italy, the 
Met must respect the negotiated return dates for the objects in the 
Morgantina Collection and the Euphronios krater, while Italy will 
be obliged to follow through on its promise to provide the museum 
with long-term loans.71 Moreover, in a more general sense, 
                                                           
68 Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 76; see also Cohan, supra note 18, at 104 
(“The development of culture is a continuous process; it is hard to draw distinct 
lines separating a people’s sense of cultural heritage from the distant past to the 
present.”). 
69 Warring, supra note 22, at 295. 
70 Tracy Wilkinson, Jason Felch & Ralph Frammolino, Getty to Return 
Artworks to Italy, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at A1 (quoting an attorney 
negotiating on behalf of the Getty as saying, “[w]e are not just arguing over 
objects, but we are working on a long-term relationship between the Getty and 
its natural partner, Italy, with respect to antiquities”). 
71 New Era Opens for Looted Art, ANSA ENGLISH MEDIA SERVICE, Nov. 
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repatriation may be seen as an expression of respect, potentially 
leading to improved international relations between the source 
nation and the nation in which the object is located. 
Not all commentators agree that such positive social effects 
should dictate the use of repatriation. Rather, some focus on the 
need to protect cultural property, and specifically, on the wealth of 
resources that museums in market nations have at their disposal to 
ensure the preservation of artifacts, contrasted with the lack 
thereof possessed by many source nations.72 Accordingly, these 
commentators argue that when the institution housing the work in a 
market nation provides a superior facility to that available in the 
source nation, the object should not be subject to repatriation.73 
Essentially, these arguments paternalistically equate a museum’s 
ability to care for art with its right to do so, asserting that museums 
are entitled to retain cultural property at issue because “source 
nations lack or fail to provide human and financial resources and 
the organizational structure needed to deal adequately with their 
cultural resources.”74 
But even conceding that market nations may, in certain 
instances, be better equipped to preserve artifacts than source 
nations, the above counter-argument ultimately maintains the 
status quo. There is little chance that source nations will ever 
possess resources that rival those of market nations if their riches 
continue to be plundered, and they continue to be forced to spend 
funds on recovery that otherwise could be spent on preservation 
and exhibition. Moreover, the belief that market nations deserve to 
retain illicitly acquired artifacts simply because they have superior 
means to care for such works is unabashedly supremacist and 
imperialist. One need only consider the logical extension of such 
argumentsthat discrepancies in monetary wealth justify the 
looting and retention of all valuables, man-made and natural, from 
                                                           
30, 2006 (Italy has already loaned the Met a Greek calyx under the agreement). 
72 See, e.g., David Lowenthal, Why Sanctions Seldom Work, 12 INT’L J. 
OF CULTURAL PROP. 393, 396 (2005) (“Italy is so stuffed with treasure that 
only a small fraction of it is catalogued or adequately cared for, let alone open to 
the public. Things are much the same the world over.”). 
73 Id. 
74 Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra note 17, at 417–18. 
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non-first world nationsan obviously indefensible proposition. 
3. Mitigating the Effects of the Black Market 
Repatriationists also argue that the process helps mitigate the 
loss of information and tangible destruction that stem from the 
black market.75 As previously discussed, the search for artifacts to 
supply the black market results in losses on multiple levels, and 
decontextualization can diminish, if not annihilate, the meaning of 
certain works of art.76 By returning looted and illegally-exported 
objects to their source nations, repatriation provides the potential 
for them to be “put[] . . . in the correct geographic and sociological 
context to better interpret their meaning and significance.”77 
In response, anti-repatriationists contend that such 
recontextualization rarely actually occurs, but rather, that 
repatriated cultural property tends simply to be transferred from a 
museum in the market nation to one in the source nation.78 In such 
situations, it is asserted, the return of the artifact provides little, if 
any, enrichment to its original cultural context, and the work often 
is less accessible to viewers than it was in its previous location.79 
But even in situations where repatriated objects are not returned to 
their original find-site, their greater proximity to it “can provide 
more information and convey greater meaning to historians, 
archaeologists, and tourists.”80 
                                                           
75 See Kelly, supra note 19, at 46. 
76 John E. Bersin, The Protection of Cultural Property and the Promotion 
of International Trade in Art, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 125, 136 
(1992); see also Kelly, supra note 19, at 54 (“As more mosaics are torn from 
their walls by torchlight, more artifacts are looted from burial chambers by 
moonlight and more paintings and tapestries are ripped from their mountings by 
thugs and thieves, science loses the ability to place the piece in its historical 
context, thus, never adding to the world’s knowledge information about the lost 
civilization that produced it.”). 
77 Kelly, supra note 19, at 46. 
78 Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 77. 
79 Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 78–79. 
80 Siegle, supra note 36 (“[O]bserving an artifact in its proper context can 
provide more information and convey greater meaning to historians, 
archaeologists, and tourists . . . . The number of cultural objects and their 
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4.  The Possibility of a Comparatively Free Cultural Property 
Market 
Repatriation additionally has the potential to exert a positive 
effect on the legitimate art market.81 The cultural property 
retention schemes82 of source nations are often criticized as 
overbroad, nondiscriminatory, and self-defeating.83 As both a 
symbol of a unified effort in the fight against the illicit antiquities 
trade and as material assistance in remedying its effects, the 
repatriation of artifacts may encourage source nations to adopt 
more moderate policies, thereby leading to a comparatively free 
cultural property market.84 In other words, “[v]oluntary 
repatriation may well stimulate an era of good feeling which, in 
turn, may prompt art source nations to reconsider their ownership 
and exportation policies.”85 
Anti-repatriationists assert that source nations excessively 
hoard their cultural property, “indiscriminately retain[ing] 
duplicates of objects beyond any conceivable domestic need, while 
[obstructing the free market by] refusing to make them available to 
museums, collectors, and dealers abroad.”86 The same argument, 
                                                           
spatial relationships among archaeological remains tells archaeologists much 
about the habits of ancient civilizations.”). 
81 Rudenstine, supra note 58. 
82 The term “cultural property retention scheme” refers to the various laws, 
including national patrimony laws and national export laws, enacted in attempts 
to retain cultural patrimony. 
83 Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 81 
[T]he definition of cultural property subject to these restrictionsis 
exceedingly broad and results in the accumulation, within theart source 
nation, of an overwhelming amount of culturalproperty that far and 
away outstrips any reasonable needs orinterests it may have . . . . 
[Additionally,] the restrictive policiescontribute to a black market in 
antiquities that leads to thedestruction of unexcavated archaeological 
sites, the destructionof artifacts themselves, and the inability to further 
theinformation of knowledge about the past. 
 Id. 
84 Rudenstine, supra note 58. 
85 Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 81. 
86 Merryman, supra note 48, at 847. Note that by the term “duplicates,” 
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however, can be made against the retention of these works by 
museums in market nations. It is commonly conceded that “[m]ajor 
western museums are so laden with objects of every kind that there 
are not the facilities for them to be permanently or properly 
exhibited, and [that] much material is simply stored, never to be 
viewed by the public.”87 Moreover, whether a certain antiquity 
should be considered a duplicate or “surplus” should be a 
determination made by the source nation, which has the 
opportunity to engage in a “close, systematic inspection [that] 
might reveal small but significant points of dissimilarity,”88 as well 
as the legitimate prerogative to decide that the retention of 
duplicates is desirable. Significantly, even if repatriation claims do 
stem from “excessive hoarding,” using this observation as an excuse 
for retaining illicit antiquities will likely lead source nations to 
adopt retention schemes that are even more stringent; both history 
and logic indicate that, as the black market grows, art-rich nations 
respond by further tightening their export laws pertaining to 
cultural property.89 
5. Attaining Cultural Nationalist Goals 
Finally, in many situations, repatriation may be appropriate 
because the cultural property at issue is intrinsic to its source 
nation’s cultural heritage.90 That is, “[w]orks of art, unique 
geological structures[,] and other objects laden with significance by 
                                                           
commentators do not refer to works that are indistinguishable from one another, 
but rather, to works that date from the same period, which possess very similar 
aesthetic value, design, and function. 
87 Greenfield, supra note 17, at 298. 
88 “[W]ithout a full and proper examination, it is not an easy task to decide 
what may be ‘redundant’. The decision cannot be made on stylistic criteria 
alone.” Brodie, supra note 41, at 86. 
89 Kelly, supra note 19, at 54. 
90 Merryman, supra note 48, at 831–32; see also Greenfield, supra note 17, 
at 297 (“[C]ultural property is most important to the people who created it or 
for whom it was created or whose particular identity and history it is bound up 
with. This cannot be compared with the scholastic or even inspirational 
influence on those who merely acquire such objects or materials.”). 
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the duration of their exposure, [are frequently] patriotic symbols of 
national pride.”91 This idea, termed “cultural nationalism,” “gives 
[source] nations a special interest [in their cultural property], 
implies the attribution of national character to objects, 
independently of their location or ownership, and legitimizes both 
national export controls and demands for . . . repatriation.” 92 
In opposition to cultural nationalists, anti-repatriationists and 
market nations have a propensity to invoke cultural internationalist 
arguments, characterized by the notion that cultural property 
should be considered to be “components of a common human 
culture, whatever their places of origin or present location, 
independent of property rights or national jurisdiction.”93 To the 
cultural internationalist, “everyone has [a somewhat equivalent] 
interest in the preservation and enjoyment of cultural property,”94 
and the opportune location for works should be determined by 
factors such as where they would be best preserved and accessible 
to the largest audiences.95 
Facially, cultural nationalist and cultural internationalist goals 
are dichotomous and seem to lead in inconsistent directions: 
Whereas cultural nationalism has been described as “nationalist” 
and “retentive,” cultural internationalism as been lauded as 
“cosmopolitan” and “protective.”96 In practice, however, they are 
not mutually exclusive, and thus it is not necessary to evaluate 
them against one another.97 As the following section will elaborate, 
theoretically, both cultural nationalist and cultural internationalist 
goals can be attained through compromises such as MBRAs. As 
such, cultural internationalist theories are more aptly construed as 
reminders of certain considerations that should be taken into 
account in any international cultural property dispute than they are 
                                                           
91 Bersin, supra note 76, at 138. 
92 Merryman, supra note 48, at 831–32. 
93 Merryman, supra note 48, at 831–32. 
94 Merryman, supra note 43, at 11. 
95 Siegle, supra note 36, at 454. 
96 Merryman, supra note 48, at 836. 
97 Eminent scholar John Merryman has suggested that, when incompatible, 
cultural internationalists’ goals should trump those of cultural nationalists. 
Merryman, supra note 48, at 853. 
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per se arguments weighing against repatriation. 
II. THE UTILITY OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL REPATRIATION 
AGREEMENTS  
Repatriation of select illicit cultural property will clearly 
diminish the illicit antiquities market and the damage it exerts. Here, 
however, the focus will be on whether entrance into MBRAs, as a 
variation of “pure”98 repatriation, is a desirable method. In the 
early 1980s, Professor Paul Bator suggested that it was, writing 
that, “museums [should] consider arrangements with foreign 
museums and governments that involve reciprocal measures, rather 
than simply repatriation of objects to their countries of origin.”99 
Over two decades later, some of the most esteemed American 
museums appear to be heeding Professor Bator’s advice. Using the 
February 2006 MBRA reached between Italy and the Met as a 
reference point, this section will focus on both the contractual and 
incidental benefits that can potentially flow from such 
compromises. 
To start with the tangible, negotiated benefits of the 2006 
agreement, the terms of the MBRA will benefit the Met in several 
ways. First, the return will occur in three phases, beginning with 
the return of four classical Apulian vases,100 as soon as possible.101 
Then, in 2008, the Met will return the Euphronios krater, credited 
as “one of the finest existing examples of Greek vessels from the 
                                                           
98 I use this term to refer to siutations where the museum or other possessor 
of the disputed object agrees to repatriate it without receiving anything in return. 
99 Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 275, 364 (1982). 
100 More specifically, the vases consist of a 6th Century Laconian kylix 
acquired by the Met in 1999, a red-figured Apulian Dinos dating from between 
340-320 B.C. and acquired by the Met in 1984, a red-figured psykter decorated 
with horsemen, ca. 520 B.C., acquired by the Met in 1996, and a red-figured 
Attic amphora by the Berlin painter, ca. 490 B.C., acquired by the Met in 1985. 
Press Release, Statement by the Metropolitan Museum of Art on its Agreement 
With the Italian Ministry of Culture (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.metmuseum. 
org/Press_Room/index.asp (follow “Press Release Archive” hyperlink; then 
follow “February 2006” hyperlink). 
101 Kennedy & Eakin, supra note 1. 
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sixth century B.C.,”102 which the museum purchased in 1972 for $1 
million.103 The return will be completed in 2010, when the Met will 
relinquish the fifteen-piece silverware set known as the Morgantina 
Collection, which the museum purchased in two lots in the early 
1980s for approximately $2.75 million.104 This schedule is 
especially beneficial for the Met because it will enable the museum 
to exhibit the Euphronios krater for nine months in its Greek and 
Roman galleries, which opened in April 2007.105 
Additionally, the agreement will protect the Met’s reputation, 
as it contains particular clauses specifying that the Met acquired 
the artifacts in good faith and waives Italy’s right to pursue any 
form of legal action against the museum for these works.106 Finally, 
Italy has promised the Met long-term loans of works of equal 
beauty and importance.107 Although precisely which works will be 
loaned has not been finalized,108 the significance of this promise 
and its role in encouraging the Met to return the works that were at 
issue must not be downplayed. Indeed, the Director of the Met 
publicly stated that, “[the museum] is particularly gratified that, 
through this agreement, its millions of annual visitors will continue 
to see comparably great works of ancient art on long-term loan 
from Italy to this institution.”109 
Italy undoubtedly reaps the principle tangible benefit of this 
agreement insofar as it will have its cultural property and heritage 
                                                           
102 Anthee Carassava, Greek Officials Planning to Bring Charges Against 
Ex-Curator, N.Y.TIMES, May 5, 2006, at A3. 
103 Slayman, supra note 4. 
104 Maura Singleton, Plunder: The Theft of the Morgantina Silver, U. VA. 
MAG., Spring 2006, available at http://www.uvamagazine.org/site/ (then follow 
“Back Issues” hyperlink; then follow “The Theft of the Morgantina Silver” 
hyperlink). 
105 Press Release, Statement by the Metropolitan Museum of Art on its 
Agreement With the Italian Ministry of Culture, supra note 100. 
106 Flescher, supra note 2. 
107 Povoledo, supra note 6, at E5. 
108 In the same month that the MBRA was signed, Italy announced its 
selection of objects to lend, but the Met has not yet announced which objects it 
will accept. Flescher, supra note 2. 
109 Press Release, Statement by the Metropolitan Museum of Art on its 
Agreement With the Italian Ministry of Culture, supra note 100. 
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back in its possession. In addition, while the Euphronios krater and 
the artifacts in the Morgantina Collection remain on exhibit at the 
Met, they are accompanied by labels reading “Lent by the 
Republic of Italy.”110 This association will thus publicize the 
works, and quite plausibly bolster tourism to see them once they 
have been returned. 
Apart from negotiated benefits such as these, other significant 
advantages stem from MBRAs. First and foremost, they allow 
parties to avoid the costs, time, and risks associated with civil 
litigation, which has been called “the dispute mechanism of last 
resort.”111 The expense of repatriation litigation tends to be 
“astronomical,”112 and at times, may outweigh that of the object at 
issue.113 MBRAs also allow source nations to avoid the 
“insurmountable obstacles and . . . procedural pitfalls [of litigation 
that] are often impossible for dispossessed owners to 
overcome.”114 Moreover, as with all settlements, compromises 
such as MBRAs skirt the “winner-takes-all” approach of litigation. 
This conciliatory approach is especially preferable given that 
disputes over cultural restitution often arouse deep-seated 
emotions,115 and “delicate moral and cultural issues.”116 
In addition, willingness to enter into an MBRA reflects 
constructively upon both parties in terms of public relations. For a 
museum like the Met, a press release stating that it has agreed to 
repatriate an object from its collection pursuant to an MBRA 
suggests both that it is eager to “do the right thing,” and that it 
                                                           
110 Flescher, supra note 2. 
111 Thomas Kline, Conference: Neutrality, Morality, and the Holocaust, 
14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 243, 248 (1998) (speaking generally with regard to 
civil litigation). 
112 McCord, supra note 23, at 996. 
113 Warring, supra note 22, at 289. 
114 These include choice of law conflicts, statutes of limitations, and 
antiquities that predate the government claiming ownership. Cohan, supra note 
18, at 69. 
115 Bersin, supra note 76, at 134. 
116 Paterson, supra note 20, at 74 (quoting the ILA Committee Report’s 
Draft Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and Transfer of 
Cultural Material). 
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lacked culpability in acquiring the object. For source nations, 
MBRAs suggest a keenness to compromise that may attract more 
sympathy for their efforts to repatriate works, limit looting, and 
curb illegal exportation, than would a display of steadfast 
entitlement.117 On a related note, MBRAs may also benefit 
international relations,118 as they require source nations and 
purchasers in market nations to find a common ground, rather than 
become adversaries. 
Further, MBRAs negate the aforementioned idea that cultural 
nationalism and cultural internationalism are dueling, irreconcilable 
philosophies with mutually exclusive goals.119 MBRAs function to 
return objects of cultural patrimony to their source nations, 
thereby providing the cultural descendants of their creators with 
the opportunity to recontextualize them and fulfilling the cultural 
nationalist’s agenda.120 At the same time, when MBRAs include a 
term promising that the source nation will provide the museum 
bestowing restitution with future long-term loans, the source nation 
maintains a presence within the museum and market nation, 
furthering the cultural internationalist’s agenda. As physical 
substitutes for the repatriated works, the works on loan become 
the new “cultural ambassadors”121 for the source nation, and the 
advantages that stem from the international distribution of cultural 
property122 are not forfeited. In the words of UNESCO’s 1976 
Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural 
Property, MBRAs are “enriching to all parties [and] also lead to a 
                                                           
117 Warring, supra note 22, at 291 (“[R]equests for restitution are [often] 
marked [by] a sense of entitlement and . . . unwillingness to compromise on 
both sides.”). 
118 Warring, supra note 22, at 243–44. If the “illicit acquisition of foreign 
national patrimony by U.S. citizens strains the United States’ relations with 
source countries,” James E. Sherry, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 511, 512 
(2005), presumably the return of such works will have a neutralizing effect. 
119 Cohan, supra note 18, at 62. 
120 Merryman, supra note 48, at 832. 
121 Borodkin, supra note 21, at 408 (The “international circulation of 
antiquities serves legitimate interests because art objects can act as cultural 
ambassadors, overcoming prejudices and national parochialism.”). 
122 Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra note 17, at 417–18. 
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better use of the international community’s cultural heritage which 
is the sum of all the national heritages.”123 In effect, MBRAs 
account for the cultural nationalists’ view that nations have a 
special interest in maintaining their cultural property, and also 
“provide the countries of origin with an opportunity to ensure that 
their cultural and artistic legacy will continue”124 beyond their 
borders. 
As a related benefit, MBRAs circumvent the oft-cited concern 
that voluntary repatriation on behalf of museums will eventually 
lead to the depletion of their antiquities collections.125 Some 
commentators have suggested that this notion is unrealistic.126 
Admittedly, antiquities are unique works and cannot be equated 
with one another, but by agreeing to long-term loans “of equal 
beauty and importance,”127 source nations such as Italy provide a 
form of compensation that mitigates the effects of the repatriation. 
Finally, when MBRAs include a promise on the part of source 
nations to loan future works to the repatriating institutions, the 
agreements help counterbalance retention schemes consisting of 
highly restrictive national patrimony laws and export 
prohibitions.128 In general, such schemes are controversial and 
                                                           
123 Cohan, supra note 18, at 58; see also Merryman, Elsen & Urice, supra 
note 17, at 417 (The “international distribution of works of a nation’s earlier 
cultures or of its more recent artists is in the nation’s interest.”). 
124 Kirby, supra note 28, at 744. 
125 Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 76. 
126 Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 76; see also Constance Lowenthal and 
Stephen E. Weil, A Dialogue on Provenance and Due Diligence, 3 IFAR J. 10, 
14 (2000) (When asked whether she was concerned that, “if we start by 
returning a few objects now, we will be getting onto a slippery slope and that 
over the next century or so museums will be emptied out completely,” 
Constance Lowenthal, the Director of the Commission for Art Recovery, 
responded, “I don’t really think that’s going to be possible even if it were 
someone’s goal.  And I don’t know whose goal it might be.”). But even if this 
apprehension does have some merit, it is rendered immaterial with MBRAs, 
which mitigate the “pinch” of repatriation so that a diminution of the museum’s 
collection does not necessarily result. 
127 Jason Felch, Getty Might Return Some Antiquities, L.A. TIMES, May 
17, 2006, at E1. 
128 Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 80. 
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widely criticized.129 By adopting them, source nations are accused 
of “fail[ing] to spread their culture[s], . . . fail[ing] to exploit such 
objects as a valuable resource for trade[,] and . . . contribut[ing] to 
the cultural impoverishment of people in other parts of the 
world.”130 Additionally, many commentators suggest that such 
schemes are self-defeating,131 functioning not to effectively limit 
the trade in cultural property, but simply to cordon off the 
legitimate market and expand its illicit counterpart.132 Italy’s 
national retention scheme provides a typical example, comprised of 
both a national ownership law133 vesting ownership in the state of 
any artifacts found in its soil since 1902, and various other 
regulations generally forbidding the export of any cultural property 
created over half a century prior.134 The breadth of these laws lends 
heightened value to Italy’s pledged long-term loans to the Met and 
the BMFA under the MBRAs reached last year. Moreover, as a 
result of the loans, the museums may have a lesser “need” or 
inclination, however minimal, to acquire antiquities in the near 
future. 
III. MBRAS PERPETUATE THE ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES TRADE 
Notwithstanding the benefits that flow from repatriation and 
MBRAs in particular, entrance into MBRAs is not the ideal means 
for solving cultural property disputes. By minimizing the inherent 
risks and padding any possible losses, MBRAs encourage 
museums to continue to acquire works of questionable provenance. 
                                                           
129 See Merryman, supra note 48, at 847. 
130 Merryman, supra note 48, at 847. 
131 Warring, supra note 22, at 277 (“UNESCO should stop towing the line 
and acknowledge that strict national retention only hurts the source nations’ 
cause.”). 
132 Merryman, supra note 48, at 848 (“Historically, the tighter the export 
control in the source nation, the stronger has been the pressure to form an illicit 
market . . . . [M]ore controls produce more illegal trade, which calls for more 
controls, and so it escalates.”). 
133 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 134 (2d 
Cir. 1999). 
134 Park, supra note 24, at 940. 
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At the same time, as a form of settlement, MBRAs detract from 
the formation of much-needed legal precedent that would inform 
source nations as to the strength of their prospective legal claims 
and deter museums from participating in the illicit antiquities 
market. 
A. MBRAs Encourage Museums to Continue to Acquire Works 
of Questionable Provenance 
Before the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting 
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property (the “UNESCO Convention”) 
was adopted in 1970, the United States was famous for 
overlooking the importation of looted and illegally exported cultural 
property and bore a corresponding reputation as the largest market 
for illicitly obtained cultural property.135 Many commentators 
assert that, since 1970, American museums have exercised greater 
self-control in terms of collection expansion,136 have increasingly 
started to inquire into donors’ identities before accepting gifts of 
questionable origin,137 and have become more careful about 
researching the origins of artifacts before purchasing them.138 
Others note that the illicit antiquities trade has grown since the 
UNESCO Convention,139 and contend that, regardless of the more 
                                                           
135 Claudia Caruthers, International Cultural Property: Another Tragedy of 
the Commons, 7 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y 143, 151 (1998). 
136 Id. (explaining that many museums in the United States have adopted 
formal acquisition policies requiring legal title, proof of compliance with the 
UNESCO Convention’s export provisions, and information on provenance). 
Contra Sherry, supra note 118, at 515–16 (quoting the director-general of 
UNESCO, who conceded that, “thirty years after the adoption of the UNESCO 
Convention . . . theft, looting, and illicit excavation continue on an appalling 
scale, thereby causing an endless depletion of peoples’ cultural treasures.”). 
137 Kelly, supra note 19, at 36–37. 
138 Kelly, supra note 19, at 31–32; Caruthers, supra note 135, at 169 n.42 
(quoting former Director of the Met, Thomas Hoving, as saying that in the 
1960s, the museum’s general acquisition policy was to “not ask anybody where 
[antiquities] came from. If [the museum] like[d] them, [the museum] bought 
them.”). 
139 Warring, supra note 22, at 232, 236. 
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stringent, ethically-sound acquisition policies museums may 
purport to practice, they remain complicit in their ways.140 
Regardless, it is undeniable that western museums are a major 
player in the art and antiquities market,141 and at least until 
relatively recently, they freely purchased works of questionable 
provenance.142 Consequently, some of the most prominent 
American museums currently house “some of the most high profile 
pieces of allegedly stolen artifacts.”143 To illustrate, an estimated 
350 items at the Getty, worth approximately $100 million, are said 
to be of dubious provenance.144 As source nations accumulate the 
evidence, means, and willpower to bring repatriation claims for 
some of these works, museums essentially react by voluntarily 
returning the object at issue, by refusing to acknowledge the claim 
in hope that it will disappear, and if not does not do so, litigating 
the dispute, or finally, by attempting to reach an MBRA with the 
source nation. 
When faced with strong evidence indicating that objects in their 
collections were illicitly excavated and/or illegally exported from 
identifiable source nations, museums should employ the first 
option and voluntarily repatriate those works. Voluntary 
repatriation allows museums to act as “stewards” for the public 
good, transferring works with questionable provenance from the 
                                                           
140 Steele IV, supra note 25, at 685 (“[D]espite their virtuous public 
stance, most museums continue to turn a blind eye toward evidence tending to 
illuminate the illicit origins of the objects they seek or have already acquired.”). 
141 McCord, supra note 23, at 987. 
142 Alia Szopa, Hoarding History: A Survey of Antiquity Looting and Black 
Market Trade, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 55, 83 (2004). 
143 Warring, supra note 22, at 238.  See also Steele IV, supra note 25 
(“The vast majority of the world’s plundered and illegally exported antiquities 
sits in the homes of private collectors and in the halls of museums.”). 
144 These items were identified by an internal review conducted by the 
Getty Trust. Additionally, there are 52 artifacts that the Italian government is 
attempting to repatriate from the Getty. These objects include “many of the 
most prestigious and striking exhibits at the . . . recently reopened Getty 
Villa . . . [and] include a sculpture of two griffins, a marble and limestone 
sculpture of the Greek goddess Aphrodite and a bronze known as Victorious 
Youth.” Dan Glaister, Getty Museum Admits 350 More Treasures May Be 
Looted, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 19, 2006, at 23. 
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private to the public realm, where they can be studied, publicized, 
and preserved while their legal standing is researched.145 Instead, 
however, museums often choose to employ the second option: 
ignoring source nations’ inquiries and claims until it becomes 
impossible to do so,146 intentionally refraining from calling 
attention to disputed works through exhibition,147 and relying upon 
procedural defenses when faced with lawsuits.148 As long as 
museums believe that the foreign governments do not have enough 
evidence to prove ownership claims, they tend to “fight hard to 
retain [the] objects.”149 
The first and third options—voluntarily returning the works or 
the employment of MBRAS—are encouraged by 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the Association of Art 
Museum Directors (“AAMD”), the International Council of 
                                                           
145 JAMES CUNO, WHO OWNS THE PAST? CULTURAL POLICY, CULTURAL 
PROPERTY, AND THE  LAW 151 (Kate Fitz Gibbon ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 
2005).  See also James Cuno, Museums and the Acquisition of Antiquities, 19 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 83, 92 (2001). 
146 For example, Turkey struggled to repatriate the 363 sixth-century 
artifacts known as the Lydian Hoard for over 25 years despite the Met being 
aware from the time of acquisition that the artifacts had recently been illegally 
excavated. Only after Turkey brought suit against the Met in United States 
federal district court, and the court denied the Met’s motion to dismiss the 
claim based on the statute of limitations, did the Met agree to return the entire 
collection. Gerstenblith, supra note 21, at 410. 
147 Gerstenblith, supra note 21, at 409. 
Because of the Met’s fears of discovery, the acquisition of [the Lydian 
Hoard] was not announced and most of the objects remained in storage 
in the basement unavailable to scholars and the public.  In 1984, 
several of the vessels were put on display, but were [deliberately] 
mislabeled as ‘East Greek’ in origin so as to confuse any who would 
attempt to search out the collection’s true origin. 
Id.  
148 Once the Lydian Hoard works were finally exhibited and Turkey was 
able to bring its claim, the Met filed a motion to dismiss based on the 
expiration of the statute of limitations, notwithstanding its aforementioned 
knowledge that the objects had indeed been illicitly excavated and exported.  
Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
149 Gertner, supra note 20. 
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Museums (“ICOM”), and the American Association of Museums 
(“AAM”).150 AAMD recommends that museums thoroughly 
“investigat[e] provenance and return[] art acquired through 
questionable means.”151 Additionally, ICOM and AAM propose 
that museums cooperate with repatriation requests from countries 
of origin,152 and have even “promulgated rules and guidelines 
designed to help museums either avoid provenance disputes or [to] 
handle their consequences.”153 For example, in 1979, the ICOM 
Executive Committee concluded the following after it adopted a 
Study on the Principles, Conditions, and Means for the Restitution 
or Return of Cultural Property in View of Reconstituting 
Dispersed Heritages (“ICOM Study”): 
In cases where the methods of acquisition . . . may be 
considered unethical by standards either [when the work 
was acquired] or by standards since, museums should weigh 
both legal and ethical considerations when considering 
requests for repatriation . . . [as well as] the value and 
benefit of such objects to their public mission [as compared 
to] the interests of the requesting party.154 
However, neither ethical codes nor guidelines such as the ICOM 
                                                           
150 Shirley Foster, Prudent ProvenanceLooking Your Gift Horse in the 
Mouth, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 143, 148 (2001); Kirby, supra note 28, at 739-
40. See also ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums, 2006, http:// 
icom.museum/ethics.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). 
151 Foster, supra note 150, at 148. 
152 See Kirby, supra note 28, at 739–40. 
153 Kirby, supra note 28, at 744; see, e.g., ICOM Ethics of Acquisition, 
http://icom.museum/acquisition.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (directing its 
member museums, inter alia, to observe the highest ethical standards “. . . in 
the very important process of acquisition,” and providing that “[i]f a museum is 
offered objects, the licit quality of which it has reason to doubt, it will contact 
the competent authorities of the country of origin in an effort to help this country 
safeguard its national heritage”); see, e.g., American Association of Museums 
Code of Ethics for Museums, http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/ 
coe.cfm (last visited Nov. 12, 2007)  (directing museums to handle “competing 
claims of ownership that may be asserted in connection with objects in its 
custody . . . openly, seriously, responsively and with respect for the dignity of 
all parties involved.”). 
154 Cohan, supra note 18, at 83–84. 
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Study are binding.155 Consequently, although museums may 
purport to follow them generally, they “have no [great] incentive 
to [do so in cases where it] would mean parting with a valued 
object from their permanent collections.”156 
Although groups such as AAMD, ICOM, and AAM 
specifically address the utility of MBRAs in their advocacy of 
returning illicit art, MBRAs are distinctly disadvantageous when 
compared with pure repatriation or litigation. MBRAs lack a 
deterrent effect, encouraging museums to continue to acquire works 
of questionable provenance by padding the risk that would 
otherwise accompany investing funds in works to which title might 
be tainted.157 The reality for museums becomes that, even in the 
very worst of situations, they will be able to exhibit and profit 
from the illicit work for a number of years. Then, when the time 
comes to return the work, museums will be given a concession, 
perhaps in the form of long-term loans of other works to which 
they might not otherwise be entitled, and will gain positive 
publicity for their cooperation, thereby counteracting any 
reputational damage. As such, museums are not forced to “feel” the 
loss of works that they wrongly acquire or the repercussions of 
their having done so, and acquiring such works becomes well worth 
the gamble. Since museums are major players in the illicit art 
market, it follows that MBRAs have the potential to inadvertently 
perpetuate its existence. 
B. MBRAs Detract from the Formation of Much-Needed 
International Legal Precedent 
Although “current [international] law unquestioningly assumes 
that repatriation is a good end in and of itself,”158 it does not 
                                                           
155 See Kirby, supra note 28, at 744. 
156 See Kirby, supra note 28, at 744. 
157 James Cuno, Ownership and Protection of Heritage: Cultural Property 
Rights for the 21st Century: U.S. Art Museums and Cultural Property, 16 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 189, 195 (2001). 
158 Andrea Cunning, U.S. Policy on the Enforcement of Foreign Export 
Restrictions on Cultural Property & Destructive Aspects of Retention Schemes, 
26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 449, 451 (2004). 
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provide much practical assistance in encouraging voluntary 
repatriation. Moreover, the relevant laws are characterized by 
numerous flaws, including limitations on applicability, financial 
burdens, ambiguous language, and a lack of uniformity in their 
application. These obstacles “create[] uncertainty for museums, 
true owners, and countries of origin.”159 Faced with virtually “no 
meaningful legal remedy available to them as they consider how to 
secure the return of their cultural heritage”160 and unable to evaluate 
the strength of their prospective legal claims, claimant nations are 
often compelled to enter into extrajudicial agreements. 
At the same time, without the threat of being subject to a viable 
cause of action, museums are ostensibly less inclined to voluntarily 
repatriate disputed objects or to discontinue exploiting the 
inadequacies of the current system by acquiring works of 
questionable provenance. This subsection will examine the two 
modern international conventions that pertain to the return of 
cultural property looted and/or illicitly exported in peacetime—the 
UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on 
Stolen or Illegally Exported Objects (the “UNIDROIT 
Convention”)—in order to show that flaws in the governing laws 
ultimately bolster MBRAs, which, as already discussed, have the 
potential to perpetuate the illicit antiquities trade. 
1.   The UNESCO Convention 
Widely considered the most significant international convention 
today pertaining to cultural property,161 the UNESCO Convention 
“views the repatriation of all archaeological artifacts as a moral 
                                                           
159 Kirby, supra note 28, at 734.  See generally Evangelos I. Gegas, 
International Arbitration and the Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes: 
Navigating the Stormy Waters Surrounding Cultural Property, 13 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 129, 134 (1997) (explaining that national courts’ 
interpretations of the provisions of international conventions have differed). 
160 Rudenstine, supra note 58, at 81. 
161 The UNESCO Convention has more “depth” than the 1954 Hague 
Convention because it covers cultural property beyond wartime and also has 
more market nation signatories than the UNIDROIT Convention. Warring, 
supra note 22, at 250. 
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imperative,”162 and “tend[s] to favor . . . repatriation . . . under all 
circumstances.”163 However, the UNESCO Convention has been 
largely unsuccessful “in furthering the restitution of stolen works 
of art,”164 and sadly, is “widely viewed as a weak, cumbersome, 
and unenforceable jumble of rhetoric.”165 
At the outset, the UNESCO Convention poses several hurdles 
that may render it entirely ineffectual as a means of repatriation. 
First, both parties involved in a cultural property dispute must be 
members of the convention in order for its provisions to apply. 
Although the UNESCO Convention boasts more signatories than 
the UNIDROIT Convention, few of them are market nations.166 
Additionally, the UNESCO Convention only provides a public 
right of action.167 Therefore, claims are dealt with on a state-to-
state level, and private dispossessed owners are left without a 
cause of action. Finally, the UNESCO Convention is of limited 
utility because it is not retroactive.168 It only applies to material 
stolen or illegally exported “after both the nation where the 
                                                           
162 Cohan, supra note 18, at 61. 
163 Cunning, supra note 158, at 490. 
164 Stephanie Doyal, Implementing the UNIDROIT Convention on Cultural 
Property into Domestic Law: the Case of Italy, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
657, 665, 700 n.29 (2001) (explaining that only a few market nations have 
ratified the UNESCO Convention, and the federal legislation in the United 
States enacting it only implements two of its articles). 
165 Kelly, supra note 19, at 44; see also Sherry, supra note 118, at 515 
(“Since the UNESCO Convention’s adoption, a scholarly consensus has 
emerged that the convention, although well-intentioned, has failed to provide the 
effective protections envisioned by its framers.”). 
166 Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States are the only major 
market nations that are state parties. UNESCO Legal Instruments, 
http://www.unesco.org/ (follow “Legal Instruments” hyperlink; then follow 
“Conventions” hyperlink; then follow “Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership 
of Cultural Property 1970” hyperlink; then follow “States Parties” hyperlink) 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007). 
167 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the 
Illicit Import, Export and Ownership of Cultural Property art. 7(b)(ii), Nov. 14, 
1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972), reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter 
UNESCO Convention]. 
168 Chang, supra note 24, at 857. 
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property is currently located and the nation from which the 
property was stolen have adopted [the convention]”169 and enacted 
implementing legislation.170 This creates a great hurdle for 
repatriating nations. For example, despite being one of the first 
nations to ratify the UNESCO Convention, the United States did 
not become a member until 1983, when Congress enacted the 
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (the 
“CPIA”).171 Accordingly, a repatriating nation has no cause of 
action against the United States under the UNESCO Convention 
for any cultural property that was stolen and/or illegally exported 
before 1983. 
Additionally, the UNESCO Convention places a heavy 
financial burden on claimant nations.172 Article 7(b)(ii) provides 
that once a nation of origin requests the return of an object that was 
illegally exported, the nation where the object is housed must  
“take all the necessary steps to recover and return the object to the 
requesting nation.”173 However, the requesting nation is required to 
“furnish, at its expense[,] the documentation and other evidence 
necessary to establish its claim for recovery and return” and is 
obliged to “pay just compensation to an innocent purchaser or to a 
person who has valid title to that property.”174 Furthermore, the 
claimant nation must bear “all expenses incident to the return and 
delivery of [the] property.”175 In the aggregate, these sums can be 
substantial, particularly since the UNESCO Convention does not 
provide any guidance insofar as what constitutes just 
compensation. As a result, claimant nations with limited funds are 
confronted with the intimidating prospect that the enforcing court 
will interpret the clause to require them to provide compensation 
beyond their means. 
                                                           
169 William H. Kenety, Who Owns the Past? The Need for Legal Reform 
and Reciprocity in the International Art Trade, 23 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 10 
(1990). 
170 Greenfield, supra note 17, at 188. 
171 Cunning, supra note 158, at 470; 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–13. 
172 Kirby, supra note 28, at 735. 
173 Kirby, supra note 28, at 735. 
174 UNESCO Convention, supra note 167. 
175 UNESCO Convention, supra note 167. 
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Even when these initial limitations are not entirely prohibitive, 
source nations may still be deterred from bringing their repatriation 
claims under the UNESCO Convention because its ambiguous 
language leaves unclear what works are covered and “promotes 
inconsistency . . . in the courtroom where it is subject to judicial 
interpretation.”176 
Two of the most significant examples of the UNESCO 
Convention’s vagueness can be found in Articles 1 and 7. Article 1 
provides an inclusive list of what constitutes “cultural property,” 
and the section explicitly states that the term encompasses 
“products of archaeological excavations (including regular or 
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries,” and “antiquities more 
than one hundred years old.”177 The list, however, is prefaced by a 
clause defining cultural property as that which has been 
“specifically designated by each State as being of importance.”178 
Accordingly, even where the cultural property at issue has been 
stolen and exported illegally, so long as the claimant nation failed to 
ever document its specific existence, the UNESCO Convention 
does not impose an obligation on state parties to recover and return 
it.179 
Additionally, the application of Article 7, which provides for 
repatriation, is unclear as to artifacts plundered from archaeological 
sites.180 Article 7 only states that coverage extends to inventoried 
cultural property stolen from museums or religious or secular 
public monuments or similar institutions.181 In sum, “proving that 
an undiscovered object falls within the UNESCO Convention’s 
definition [of cultural property] and that the convention should 
govern poses an uphill [and often dispositive] battle for a nation 
petitioning for the repatriation of the looted object.”182 
Finally, although signatories to the UNESCO Convention agree 
                                                           
176 Claudia Fox, The Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Objects, 29 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 225, 251 (1993). 
177 UNESCO Convention, supra note 167, at art. 1. 
178 UNESCO Convention, supra note 167, at art. 1. 
179 Cohan, supra note 18, at 50. 
180 Cohan, supra note 18, at 6. 
181 UNESCO Convention, supra note 167, at art. 7. 
182 Chang, supra note 24, at 841. 
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to cooperate and act in a timely manner in returning cultural 
property,183 the CPIA imposes detailed statutes of limitations that 
greatly diminish its utility in the United States. Essentially, the 
sub-clauses of 19 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)184 extinguish source nations’ 
causes of actions in any of four situations, which take into account 
the following factors: the number of years that the museum has 
possessed the object, whether the museum was a bona fide 
purchaser, whether the museum publicized the object, and, if so, 
how recently, and whether the claimant party knew or should have 
known of the object’s location.185 These statutes of limitations 
each provide a notice requirement, but fail to acknowledge the 
complex evidentiary burdens that the UNESCO Convention may 
impose on claimant nations. Even if a source nation is aware of the 
location and possessor of its cultural property, it may take several 
years for it to accumulate sufficient evidence to bring a repatriation 
claim, by which time a subdivision of § 2611(2) may render the 
cultural property exempt.186 In many situations, the statute forces 
a source nation seeking to repatriate its cultural property to choose 
                                                           
183 UNESCO Convention, supra note 167, at art. 13(b) & (c). 
184 Convention on Cultural Property Act, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2611(2)(A)-(D) 
(1983). 
185 Ashton Hawkins, Richard A. Rothman & David B. Goldstein, A Tale 
of Two Innocents, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 83–84 (1995). Specifically, the 
statutes of limitation have run: (1) when the object has been held for at least 
three years by a museum or similar institution in the United States that 
purchased it in good faith, reported the acquisition in certain publications, 
displayed it to the public for at least one year, and made it available to the 
public for a minimum of two years; (2) when the object has been held for at least 
ten consecutive years and been publicly exhibited for at least five; (3) when the 
object has been held for at least ten consecutive years and the claimant party 
received or should have received notice of its whereabouts; and (4) when the 
object has been held for at least twenty consecutive years and the possessor can 
prove that it was a bona fide purchase. Convention on Cultural Property Act, 19 
U.S.C.S. § 2611(2)(A)-(D). 
186 For example, Italian authorities became aware that the Met had the 
Morgantina Collection in its possession as early as 1987. Slayman, supra note 
4. Nevertheless, it was not until nine years later that the Italian government felt 
it had sufficient proof of the works’ origins that it started to make appeals to the 
Met, and it was only after certain evidence was discovered in 2005 that the 
museum became willing to enter into talks with Italy. Id. 
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between bringing its claim prematurely, or losing its cause of action 
altogether. 
Notwithstanding the gravity of these flaws, it is imperative that 
the UNESCO Convention is utilized by claimant nations to 
judicially delineate its meaning. As enforcing courts interpret the 
UNESCO Convention, it will become more clear how just 
compensation should be calculated, the degree of detail that is 
needed for the specific designation requirement to be met, and the 
quantum of proof that a claimant nation must provide in order to 
prevail. With this information at their disposal, source nations will 
likely be able to better comprehend and weigh the relative merits of 
their repatriation options. At the same time, litigation under the 
UNESCO Convention will become a viable threat, thereby 
deterring institutions and private collectors that finance the illicit 
antiquities market from continuing to purchase works of 
questionable provenance. Only when both sides are supplied with 
equal information and knowledge will entrance into MBRAs truly 
be a desirable alternative to litigation. 
2. The UNIDROIT Convention 
Twenty-five years after UNESCO Convention was passed, 
UNESCO requested that the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law draft the UNIDROIT Convention187 in 
order “to establish a new [complementary] framework to govern 
the restitution of stolen cultural objects.”188 Credited as being the 
most “restitution centered”189 of the conventions, the UNIDROIT 
Convention “fight[s] against the illicit trade of cultural objects by 
establishing common, minimal rules for the return and restitution of 
cultural objects between contracting states.”190 However, bringing a 
claim pursuant to the UNIDROIT Convention was not a viable 
                                                           
187 Warring, supra note 22, at 252. 
188 Fox, supra note 176, at 256. 
189 Warring, supra note 22, at 291–92. 
190 Emily A. Maples, Holocaust Art: It Isn’t Always “Finders Keepers, 
Losers Weepers”: A Look at Art Stolen During the Third Reich, 9 TULSA J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 355, 373 (2001). 
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alternative for the claimant nations that reached MBRAs with 
American museums earlier this year because the United States, 
along with other major market nations,191 has neither signed nor 
ratified the Convention.192 Even if the United States were to do so, 
these nations would likely still be inclined to enter into MBRAs 
rather than face the various obstacles and vague language currently 
presented by the UNIDROIT Convention. 
At first read, the UNIDROIT Convention appears to address 
several of the UNESCO Convention’s fundamental flaws. Unlike 
the UNESCO Convention, Chapter II of the UNIDROIT 
Convention provides for a private right of action, enabling parties 
other than states to bring their claims.193 Moreover, although the 
UNIDROIT Convention adopts the same definition of cultural 
property as the UNESCO Convention, it does not require states to 
specifically designate cultural property in order for it to be 
protected.194 Yet despite its superficially uncompromising nature, 
the UNIDROIT Convention is heavily qualified by its various 
provisions pertaining to repatriation, limitations, and 
compensation. 
First, Article 4(1) of the UNIDROIT Convention clearly 
provides that “[t]he possessor of a stolen cultural object [shall be] 
require[d] to return it.”195 But this unequivocal language only 
extends to property that is either “unlawfully excavated or 
                                                           
191 Chang, supra note 24, at 859 (noting that the UNIDROIT Convention 
lacks impact because it lacks participation of major market nations such as the 
U.S., the U.K., and Japan). 
192 That is, the United States was not a signatory to the UNIDROIT 
Convention and did not enact implementing legislation. Sherry, supra note 
118, at 517. 
193 Palmer, supra note 16, at 16.  Contra Kathleen Andersen, The 
International Theft and Illegal Export of Cultural Property, 8 NEW ENG. INT’L 
& COMP. L. ANN. 411, 428 (2002) (noting that, in actuality, the process for the 
restitution of illegally-exported cultural property in Chapter III very closely 
resembles public law). 
194 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Objects art. 
3(2), June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322, available at http://www.unidroit.org/ 
english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/1995culturalproperty-e.htm [hereinafter 
UNIDROIT Convention]. 
195 Id. at art. 4(1). 
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lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained.”196 The repatriation of 
illegally exported cultural property is addressed separately under 
Article 5, which imposes a heightened burden on the claimant state: 
The court or other competent authority of the State 
addressed shall order the return of an illegally exported 
cultural object if the requesting State establishes that the 
removal of the object from its territory significantly impairs 
one or more of the following interests: (a) the physical 
Preservation of the object or of its context; (b) the integrity 
of a complex object; (c) the preservation of information . . . 
; (d) the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or 
indigenous community, or . . . that the object is of 
significant cultural importance for the requesting State.197 
The text does not, however, define what constitutes “significant 
impairment,” but rather, leaves the issue entirely within the 
discretion of the enforcing court. As such, until a substantial 
amount of case law has interpreted the term of art, claimant nations 
will have little information from which to gage whether they will be 
able to meet this standard. 
Insofar as the statutes of limitations, the UNIDROIT 
Convention’s are more complex than those of the UNESCO 
Convention. Article 3 creates a tri-part system: Pursuant to Article 
3(3), “[a]ny claim for restitution [must] be brought within a period 
of three years from the time when the claimant knew the location 
of the cultural object and the identity of its possessor, and in any 
case[,] within a period of fifty years from the time of the theft.”198 
However, Articles 3(4) and 3(5) carve out two major exceptions to 
this temporal framework. Notwithstanding Article 3(3), restitution 
claims pertaining to works “forming an integral part of an identified 
monument or archaeological site, or belonging to a public collection, 
shall not be subject to time limitations other than a period of three 
years from the time when the claimant knew the location of the 
cultural object and the identity of its possessor,”199 and “any 
                                                           
196 Id. at art. 3(2). 
197 Id. at art. 5(3) (emphasis added). 
198 Id. at art. 3(3). 
199 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 194, at art. 3(4). 
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Contracting State may declare that a claim is subject to a time 
limitation of 75 years or such longer period as is provided in its 
law.”200 In addition to the aforementioned evidentiary 
requirements, these temporal requirements can amount to heavy, 
and at times, defeatist burdens. 
Moreover, pursuant to Article 4 of the UNIDROIT 
Convention, claimant nations are required to provide “fair and 
reasonable compensation” to the possessor party, so long as the 
“possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known that 
the object was stolen [or illegally exported],” and the possessor 
“can prove that it exercised due diligence when acquiring the 
object.”201 Article 4(2) attempts to hold dealers responsible for this 
compensation, stating that “reasonable efforts shall be made to 
have the person who transferred the cultural object to the 
possessor” be liable.202 Realistically, however, Articles 4(1) and 
6(1)203 closely resemble the compensation provision of the 
UNESCO Convention. In effect, the UNIDROIT Convention 
“grant[s] [the original owner] an option to repurchase the 
artwork.”204 
The compensation provisions of the UNIDROIT Convention 
also resemble those of the UNESCO Convention in that they are 
plagued by vague terms and phrases.205 The UNIDROIT 
                                                           
200 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 194, at art. 3(5). 
201 The due diligence requirement only applies in cases involving stolen 
property. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note  194, at arts. 4(1), 6(1). 
202 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 194, at art. 4(2). 
203 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 194, at arts. 4(1), 6(1) (Article 4(1) 
provides that “[t]he possessor of a stolen cultural object required to return it 
shall be entitled, at the time of its restitution, to payment of fair and reasonable 
compensation provided that the possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to 
have known that the object was stolen and can prove that it exercised due 
diligence when acquiring the object.”  Article 6(1) provides that “[t]he possessor 
of a cultural object who acquired the object after it was illegally exported shall 
be entitled, at the time of its return, to payment by the requesting State of fair 
and reason [sic] compensation, provided that the possessor neither knew nor 
ought reasonably to have known at the time of acquisition that the object had 
been illegally exported.”). 
204 Grover, supra note 30, at 1455. 
205 Gegas, supra note 159, at 145–47. 
FALKOFF FINAL AUTHORIZATION 2.DOC 11/26/07 2:09 PM 
 MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL REPATRIATION AGREEMENTS 303 
Convention recognizes that its terms and provisions must be 
judicially interpreted by each Contracting Party’s national 
courts.206 Most prominently, what constitutes reasonable 
compensation is never explained, but rather, is left entirely to the 
discretion of the state litigating the case.207 The resulting 
uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that common law and civil 
law nations may be prone to “interpreting the same provisions in 
much different manners”208 because common law courts adhere to 
the nemo dat rule that a thief cannot convey valid title209 and 
because civil law courts favor the bona fide purchaser over the 
dispossessed original owner.210 As such, a common law court might 
be inclined to find, under its national laws, that no compensation 
need be provided,211 whereas a civil law court might require the 
claimant nation to compensate the possessor for the full purchase 
price.212 Similarly, civil and common law courts may reach 
disparate conclusions as to whether the possessor exercised due 
diligence213 because the UNIDROIT Convention does not specify 
the weight to be afforded to the factors that constitute due diligence 
or whether the list is exhaustive.214 
                                                           
206 Gegas, supra note 159, at 148. 
207 Gegas, supra note 159, at 148–49. 
208 Gegas, supra note 159, at 148–49; see UNIDROIT Convention, supra 
note 194 for language. 
209 Doyal, supra note 164, at 668 (explaining that civil law systems tend to 
afford greater protection to the purchaser of stolen property). 
210 Doyal, supra note 164, at 668. 
211 Gegas, supra note 159, at 145–49. 
212 Gegas, supra note 159, at 150. 
213 Gegas, supra note 159, at 148–49. 
214 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 194, at art. 4(4). 
In determining whether the possessor exercised due diligence, regard 
shall be had to all the circumstances of the acquisition, including the 
character of the parties, the price paid, whether the possessor consulted 
any reasonably accessible register of stolen cultural objects, and any 
other relevant information and documentation which it could reasonably 
have obtained, and whether the possessor consulted accessible agencies 
or took any other step that a reasonable person would have taken in the 
circumstances. 
Id. 
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As the UNIDROIT Convention now stands, its application 
and interpretation are dependent upon the jurisdiction in which it is 
being invoked.215 Accordingly, as with the UNESCO Convention, 
repatriation claims must be brought pursuant to the UNIDROIT 
Convention in order for “[c]rucial issues, standards and terms . . . 
to be clarified by judicial interpretation.”216 As cases are brought 
and decisions are handed down, what tends to constitute 
“significant impairment” and “fair and reasonable compensation” 
will become evident, and source nations will be in a better position 
to evaluate the strength of their legal claims. Until such case law is 
on the books, however, MBRAs will detract from the formation of 
such precedent, leaving claimant nations in pursuit of a legal 
remedy with burdens that are simultaneously intimidating and 
unclear. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the diversity of views within the repatriation 
discourse, few would dispute that repatriation provides a remedy 
to minimize the damage caused by the illicit antiquities trade and 
that it is necessary to curb its existence. But as a variation of pure 
repatriation, MBRAs have the counter effect. By padding the 
corresponding risks and possible losses, MBRAs encourage 
museums and other institutions to continue to acquire works of 
questionable provenance. At the same time, MBRAs detract from 
the formation of much-needed judicial precedent interpreting 
international conventions that would better inform source nations 
as to the strengths of their prospective legal claims and render 
MBRAs a genuine alternative. 
 
                                                           
215 Gegas, supra note 159, at 150. 
216 Gegas, supra note 159, at 150. 
